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ABSTRACT
Today’s Internet achieves end-to-end connectivity through
bilateral contracts between neighboring networks; unfortu-
nately, this “one size fits all” connectivity results in less effi-
cient paths, unsold capacity and unmet demand, and some-
times catastrophic market failures that result in global dis-
connectivity. This paper presents the design and evaluation
of MINT, a Market for Internet Transit. MINT is a connec-
tivity market and corresponding set of protocols that allows
ISPs to offer path segments on an open market. Edge net-
works bid for end-to-end paths, and a mediator matches bids
for paths to collections of path segments that form end-to-
end paths. MINT can be deployed using protocols that are
present in today’s routers, and it operates in parallel with the
existing routing infrastructure and connectivity market. We
present MINT’s market model and protocol design; evaluate
howMINT improves efficiency, the utility of edge networks,
and the profits of transit networks; and howMINT can oper-
ate at Internet scale.
1. Introduction
The Internet’s growth and the demands of a wide variety
of applications and traffic types has created a need for the
network to provide different levels of connectivity—and dif-
ferent guarantees—to different pairs of sources and destina-
tions. Once an experimental research network, the Internet
now hosts applications ranging from video conferencing to
bulk file transfer. IP has provided a ripe substrate for build-
ing many applications; unfortunately, today’s routing infras-
tructure is often inadequate for supporting this diverse set of
applications. With so many requirements, it is increasingly
difficult for a single routing infrastructure, federated across
tens of thousands of independently operated networks, to
provide efficient, reliable connectivity to every application.
Today’s Internet routing protocol, Border Gateway Proto-
col [1], allows independently operated networks to exchange
traffic and express preferences according to certain types
of business relationships. Unfortunately, edge networks are
typically constrained to “one size fits all” contracts, where
an edge network pays a single rate for connectivity to all
destinations, and relies on the existence of pairwise con-
tracts between transit service providers to ensure the exis-
tence of reliable and efficient paths. This market structure is
inherently inefficient because edge networks cannot pay for
end-to-end paths in accordance with how much they value
them. The failings of the current market structure is most ev-
ident in “depeering” incidents, where edge networks become
partitioned from one another when bilateral contracts in the
middle of the network dissolve [2–4]. However, bilateral
contracts create inefficiencies even in normal operation, be-
cause the existence and nature of connectivity between two
ASes depends on myopic business decisions between those
two ASes. The value of a path is only indirectly transferred
from the edge networks to the transit ASes in the middle of
the network. Bilateral agreements make the Internet less re-
liable too: many paths that exists in the underlying graph
would never get exposed, even in extreme failure scenarios.
In this paper, we propose a Market for Internet Transit
(MINT). MINT is a connectivity market and set of support-
ing protocols that moves away from proprietary, bilateral
contracting towards an open system to enable the “invisible
hand” of competition. MINT allows networks to buy end-to-
end paths from transit ISPs, which advertise path segments
between intermediate exchange points at various prices to a
mediator, who matches bids for end-to-end paths to collec-
tions of offers for path segments. MINT operates in parallel
to the existing BGP routing infrastructure—as such, it is not
intended to supplant BGP routing, but rather to provide an
alternative means for ISPs to sell spare capacity and edge
networks to buy connectivity to specific destinations. We
show that MINT improves the efficiency of resource use and
increases both utility of edge networks and profits for ISP
networks, and also that MINT can operate at Internet-scale.
The design of MINT poses significant challenges. MINT
must provide a mechanism for matching collections of path
segments that are offered by ISPs to requests for end-to-end
paths from buyers (i.e., edge networks). To do so, MINT’s
protocols implement a first-price path auction. First, the
mechanism must provide incentives for each party to par-
ticipate in MINT. Specifically, we must show that ISPs will
garner more profit by participating in MINT than they would
if they just routed all of their traffic over BGP alone. Second,
MINT must scale well with the growth of the network, with
the rate of requests for paths, and with the overall link failure
rate. In addition to the basic economic efficiency and scal-
ability concerns, MINT poses a number of secondary chal-
lenges as well. MINT’s design must preserve the privacy of
transit networks, while still providing a market over which
these providers can sell their spare capacity. MINTmust also
potentially reconcile disparity of contracts—because edge
networks buy end-to-end paths, the quality and guarantees
associated with each advertised path segment must be stan-
dardized.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, we
present MINT, a new market for buying and selling Internet
transit. We design a market mechanism to allow edge net-
works to purchase end-to-end paths from collections of seg-
ments sold by transit ASes. This market allows for a more
direct transfer of value from the edge networks that need
connectivity to the transit networks, who need to be paid for
providing capacity. Second, we present a detailed protocol
design for MINT that is both scalable and compatible with
protocols already implemented on today’s routers. Third,
we present a detailed two-part evaluation: (1) we show that
MINT provides significant gains in surplus to both edge
networks and transit ASes over today’s BGP-based market;
(2) we show that MINT can operate at Internet scale.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents design goals and a high-level overview of MINT.
Section 3 describe the protocols that implement the mar-
ket. In Section 4, we show that MINT provides significant
surplus to both users and transit ISPs over BGP’s bilateral
contracts; Section 5 argues that MINT can operate at Inter-
net scale, even as the Internet continues to grow. Section 6
presents related work, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Overview
In this section we outline the goals for our market design
and provide a high-level overview on how we achieve these
goals.
2.1 Design Goals
MINT’s market should be open, profitable for all entities,
and its implementation should be easy to manage. We first
discuss the design goals for the market; then, we outline the
design goals for supporting protocols.
2.1.1 Market
Open. The primary objective in our design is to ensure
that the market for end-to-end paths is open. With BGP
today, connectivity depends on bilateral contracts between
upstream providers. In contrast, MINT provides a market
where edge networks can buy paths if their valuation for
those paths is greater than the total sum cost of the segments.
Such a market structure would not only allow for prices to
more directly reflect the value that edge networks have for
each path, but it would also improve efficiency, since excess
capacity could be sold on an open market to buyers; this
model contrasts with today’s structure, where an AS cannot
sell excess capacity unless one of its immediate neighbors
wants to buy it.
Profitable. To be sustainable, MINT must provide incen-
tives for each party to participate. In other words, both
the buyers and the sellers (defined in the next subsection)
must have an incentive to participate: the costs of support-
ing MINT, as well as selling excess capacity at a potentially
lower price than otherwise available in a less open market,
must both be countered by the additional profits that an AS
could garner by running MINT. Similarly, MINT must pro-
vide significant benefit to the edge networks over simply us-
ing today’s BGP protocol and selecting the best available
upstream provider.
Manageable. MINT should also be easily manageable: Net-
work operators should retain control over how traffic tra-
verses their networks, and it should be easy for operators to
set and adjust prices for various segments. When a path seg-
ment is sold, MINT should provide mechanisms that make
it easy for an operator to manage the establishment of new
paths, as well as the connection of the path segment in the
local network to the adjoining path segments along the end-
to-end path.
2.1.2 Protocols
To implement market with the properties describe above,
we must employ a set of protocols. Such protocols, if de-
ployed in the Internet scale pose many design challenges.
Here we introduce the main design goals for the protocol
infrastructure supporting MINT system.
Scalability. First and foremost, MINT’s control plane must
support a potentially large number of buyers and sellers. The
number of buyers grows with the number of edge networks
that wish to buy and sell paths and with the total number of
destinations (i.e., IP prefixes). The number of sellers grows
with the number of segments, which is essentially the num-
ber of paths between any pair of exchanges. This number
is difficult to estimate in practice, but we present methods
for estimating the total number of segments in Section 4;
and likely grow trends in Section 5. In Section 5, we will
also evaluate how MINT’s control and data planes scale as
the number of segments grows, and as the number of overall
destinations grows.
Backwards compatibility. MINTmust run on today’s Inter-
net infrastructure. In addition to implementing MINT with
existing protocols, we must also ensure that the hardware
that forwards best-effort traffic, could accommodate MINT.
Additionally, to the extent possible, we aim design MINT’s
data and control planes using protocols that are already stan-
dardized and implemented on today’s routers. Our contri-
bution is thus not any single protocol, but the design of the
overall framework that allows existing protocols to be used
to implement MINT.
Containment. MINT should allow the network providers
to advertise their services, while withholding business-
sensitive details about the network that the provider does
not wish to make public (e.g., the network topology). Addi-
tionally, when local networks experience failures that do not
affect the connectivity of the advertised path possible (note
that this property differs markedly from BGP-based interdo-
main routing, where local changes can propagate globally).
Speed. The mechanism for establishing and tearing down
paths must be lightweight enough to allow services to
be efficiently sold. The mechanism for establishing the
paths themselves should not significantly degrade the over-
all packet forwarding rate—routers should forward packets
along MINT paths at line rate.
Accountability. MINT must provide enough accountability
for contract enforcement for proper market operation. Exist-
ing mechanisms, such as clearing houses, reputation systems
or accounting monitors [5] or other traffic auditing mecha-
nisms [6, 7] might help MINT provide better accountability,















Figure 1: High-level MINT architecture. IXP - exchange point.
implementing accountability mechanisms for MINT to fu-
ture work.
2.2 MINT Overview
In this section, we present an overview of MINT’s mar-
ket model. We briefly describe the participants, the auction-
based structure of the market, and the mechanism that the
mediator uses to construct end-to-end paths from segments.
MINT implements a continuous dynamic version of a
first-price path auction [8]: Transit providers sell links, or
path segments, at some price, and buyers pay for end-to-end
paths. The amount that the buyer pays is equal to the sum of
the advertised prices for each link along that path.
MINT has three classes of participants: buyers, sellers,
and a mediator. Buyers may be either large Internet service
providers (ISPs) or edge networks. Sellers are typically large
transit ISPs, although they may also be edge networks that
have more than one interdomain connection and spare ca-
pacity. The marketplace is implemented by a centralizedme-
diator, which aggregates the information about the product
to be traded (available path segments), and matches demand
for end-to-end paths to supply of path segments. Figure 1
illustrates this high-level operation.
Basic operationSellers advertise path segments to the medi-
ator with multiple attributes, including available bandwidth
and price. We call these advertisements transit state updates.
A path segment is essentially a connection between two ex-
change points (or, more generally, a connection between an
ingress and egress of a single ISP). For each path segment,
a transit network uses distributed path computation to com-
pute and establish node-level paths between the network’s
ingress and egress points. Updates about path segments only
contain aggregate information; they do not reveal any infor-
mation about the internal functioning of the network, thus
preserving the privacy of the ISP’s topology.
When a customer requires a path to another network, it is-
sues a request with the path’s endpoints (i.e., the source and
destination exchanges), as well as any constraints the path
must meet, such as minimum bandwidth, maximum delay,
and a list of networks to avoid. Each end-to-end path pur-
chased by a buyer would typically comprise multiple seg-
ments. Sellers and buyers use the mediator to enable the
exchange of goods by matching demand (i.e., end-to-end
paths) to supply (i.e., collections of path segments). Note
that a network can act as a buyer for some requests (if it acts
as a request source) and as a seller for other requests (if it
provides transit).
For each request, the mediator finds the lowest cost
exchange-level path that satisfies the requested constraints.
If such a path is found, the mediator returns this path (and
the associated resources) to the buyer. For the purposes of
this paper, we describe MINT as a mechanism for selling
paths with desired capacities. In this case, the mediator can
construct a path from segments greedily, by running a capac-
ity constrained shortest paths algorithm using only paths that
are lower than the price that the buyers are willing to pay.
More generally, however, MINT could sell paths with other
performance objectives as well (e.g., loss or latency targets).
If the mediator cannot find a collection of path segments that
satisfies the buyer’s bid, the mediator simply drops the bid.
We assume that if a bid is not satisfied, the buyer will submit
a re-valued bid.
Price adjustment and information In an ideal, competitive
open market, sellers of goods can determine the equilibrium
price for a good by adjusting price according to the user’s
demand. For goods that are perfect substitutes, and mar-
kets that are competitive, prices will converge to marginal
cost. However, the MINT market is complicated by the fact
that (1) sellers (i.e., ISPs) do not know whether other ISPs
are selling complementary goods (i.e., path segments), and
(2) they also do not know the prices at which these goods
are being sold to other users. This makes it more difficult
for a seller to determine exactly how it should set prices on
any given segment. We assume that the seller uses a sim-
ple price adjustment model, whereby the seller sets a price
for each segment, observes the utilization on the link after a
fixed period of time, and raises the price on the segment if
the utilization exceeds some threshold (and vice versa, low-
ers the price if utilization drops below a certain threshold).
Truthfulness in advertisements and bidding We note that
market participants may have incentives to distort their char-
acteristics to the mediator, leading to inefficient outcomes.
Truthfulness in path auctions is a general concern: we aim
to design auctions where buyers will bid their valuations and
sellers do not overcharge. Related work studied VCG-based
auctions, for example, and found that overpayment can be
very high in these settings; other work suggests that first-
price path auctions are not necessarily subject to the same
overpayment [8].
It is worth noting that in MINT, there are legitimate rea-
sons for sellers to avoid truthfully revealing their capacity
when they advertise path segments. The connectivity infor-
mation that an ISP announces may not necessarily reflect the
exact state of the network but rather the state that the ISP is
willing to disclose. For example, it might “under-promise
and over-deliver”, announcing less capacity than they might
actually have in total. In Section 5, we examine the extent to
which under-promising capacity in path segments can im-
prove the overall scalability of the system. On the other
hand, an ISP might also overbook its available capacity, sell-
ing more capacity than it is capable of carrying on various
links.
3
3. MINT Protocols and Components
This section describe the protocols that we use to imple-
ment MINT. We first discuss the high-level requirements for
MINT’s protocols; we then describe MINT’s control plane,
which is the mechanism that implements the auction itself.
Finally, we present MINT’s data plane, which allows data
packets to be forwarded along MINT paths.
MINT protocol design goals are outlined in Section 2. In
this Section, show howMINT could be implemented in prac-
tice and deployed on the existing Internet, in parallel to the
existing BGP-based infrastructure. Aside from the general
requirements, MINT has a set of functional requirements.
At a high level, ISPs need a mechanism to announce seg-
ment capacities and prices to a contract mediator, and edge
networks that wish to obtain end-to-end paths must have the
interface to request them (as shown in Figure 1). Finally,
once the mediator sells a path, the ASes along the path must
establish forwarding state for the path itself.
3.1 Control Plane
MINT control plane runs over a set of protocols between
ISPs, mediators and clients. Each AS issues transit state an-
nouncements, which contain the price and parameters (e.g.,
capacity, price) for each segment. A segment is defined by a
pair of exchanges (with unique exchange IDs) that ISP con-
nects. Each AS freely chooses which segments to announce
to the mediator, as well as the parameters of each. Buy-
ers issue bids for paths between a connecting exchange and
another exchange. The bid contains the source and desti-
nation exchanges, path constraints, and maximum bid price.
The mediator collects announcements from transit ISPs and
matches them with bids. All control-plane mechanisms only
require middle-box setup at sellers and buyers, without fun-
damental changes to current control protocols.
3.1.1 Sellers: Transit ASes
Monitoring. ASes that provide transit services employmon-
itors as an add-on network element that observes the internal
network state between exchanges, accepts operator policies
and reports transit-state updates between those exchanges
to the mediator. These monitors can be implemented us-
ing standard link-state monitors [9] to collect network state
information. Routing protocols such as OSPF [10] or IS-
IS [11] support dissemination of additional information (e.g.,
capacity) through ISIS-TE [12] and OSPF-TE [13] exten-
sions. These extensions also support capacity updates on
multiple traffic classes [14], enablingMINT to track and sell
different levels of service. Various other optimizations (such
as sending updates only when certain bandwidth thresh-
olds are crossed) can also help reduce update traffic. Many
large networks already employ these technologies for intra-
domain traffic engineering.
Pricing. Operators, managing ISP networks and controlling
segment sales, set the prices on entire segments. Opera-
tors could alternatively set prices on individual links, which
subsequently get aggregated to segment prices before being
exported to mediator. Although we assume that operators
could set segment prices individually, in practice they could
<update AS=10001>
<state id=EFFEFFEE seq=1>
<exchanges ex1=0xEFFE ex2=0xFFEE />
<bandwidth bw=100 units=’Mbps’ />
<mrb bw=10 units=’Mbps’ />
<price hour=10 day=230 month=6500 />
</state>
<state id=FFEE3FFF seq=1>
<exchanges ex1=0xFFEE ex2=0x3FFF />
<bandwidth bw=300 units=’Mbps’ />
<mrb bw=5 units=’Mbps’ />
<ask hour=10 day=220 month=6000>
</state>
</update>
Figure 2: Example transit-state update.
also be automated, leveraging prior work on market predic-
tion and automated agent theory [15].
Announcement format. Exchanges announced in transit-
state updates serve as the “glue” that connects multiple seg-
ments to form a complete end-to-end path; they must use
uniform addressing to help identify these exchanges. Any
naming system that does not allow duplicates can be used
(e.g., DNS names, or even MAC-like addresses). In our
examples, we will use a 16 bit hexadecimal notation (i.e.
FFEE).
The interface between the mediator and monitor can use
any standard information transfer, or Web services protocol,
such as SOAP, which uses HTTP for transport and XML for
update formating. We use SOAP due to its ubiquitous de-
ployment, and the fact that it has previously been shown
to scale well [16]. In our examples, we encode updates in
XML.
Figure 2 shows an example of a transit-state update. The
update comes fromAS 10001 and contains two transit states:
the state between exchanges EFFE and FFEE, and the state
between exchanges FFEE and 3FFF. Transit-states resem-
ble conventional link-states as used in link-state protocols:
they have an identifier (id) and a sequence number (seq).
The identifier must uniquely identify the set of exchanges
within an ISP, while the sequence number is used to identify
the latest update and invalidate older ones. In the example
in Figure 2, id is formed by pairing exchange point identi-
fiers, while seq indicates that this update is the first one to be
announced.
The bandwidth parameter specifies how much bandwidth
is available for purchase, while mrb designates the minimum
reservable bandwidth. Minimum reservable bandwidth is
the lowest quantum of bandwidth that is available for pur-
chase. This setting enables data plane scaling if only a lim-
ited number of transit paths are supported. The price in the
update is indicated with the ask parameter. ISPs can set dif-
ferent rates for different timescales. It is likely that longer
contracts will mandate lower prices. This schema can be
easily expanded as needed for adding new features (e.g., cap-
ping minimum or maximum contract duration) in future.
Scaling. Any AS that connects n exchanges and is willing to
provide transit between any or all of themmight need to send
up to O(n2) updates to the mediator. In practice, large tran-
sit ISPs might participate in thousands of exchanges, thus the
number of transit-state updates can become prohibitive. For-
tunately, such amount of updates are not necessary; recent




<finish ex=0x3FFF AS=10003 payload=’IP’ />
<bandwidth bw=10 units=’Mbps’ />
<duration units=’day’ len=2 />
<bid max=200 />
</request>
Figure 3: Example bid for an end-to-end path.
(exchanges, in our case) to express the topology and pric-
ing of paths within an ISP. The mediator can encourage such
segment reductions by charging ISPs for each state that they
announce.
3.1.2 Buyers: Edge Networks
Buyers could use a schema similar to sellers to communi-
cate with the mediator. Figure 3 shows an example request.
The request indicates an AS requesting a path between an
entry and exit exchange; in addition to the exit exchange,
the destination AS is also noted. The update contains the
required bandwidth and duration for the path. The bid vari-
able indicates the maximum price that the buyer is willing to
pay for the path. The property payload of parameter finish is
shown to highlight that our mechanism can be used for any
payload (more on this parameter in data plane section). This
schema can also be easily extended to support arbitrary pa-
rameters for path computation in the mediator (e.g., requests
for backup paths, exchange-diverse paths, avoiding certain
exchanges).
Network operators could issue requests when business
policies change, for specific applications that requires on-
demand bandwidth (e.g., video conference), or when traffic
from some applications increase. Request generation could
be automated; network management systems could issue
path requests when traffic to given destinations cross pre-
defined thresholds.
Matching paths can be computationally intensive. In the
next section, we explore how to minimize unnecessary com-
putations. The mediator could also moderate its load by
charging a nominal fee for each new request. Such a fee, the
“markup”, should be high enough to cover the mediator’s
costs in running the clearinghouse and also make a profit.
This transaction fee is similar to that in stock market trading
systems and provides an incentive to run a mediator.
3.1.3 Mediator: Matching buyers and sellers
The mediator has two components: the transit state
database, and the computational component. The transit
state database processes and stores all the transit-state up-
dates; any received transit-state update causes a change
to this database. The computational element is triggered
only by path computation requests. The computation ele-
ment operates using a read-only snapshot of the transit state
database, which helps achieve better scaling and consistency.
Matching segments to paths. The computation compo-
nent in the mediator runs the matching algorithms specific
to the good being traded. If only one additive constraint
is used (e.g., cost) in combination with one or more lim-
iting constraints (e.g., bandwidth), the simple constrained
shortest path first algorithm will find the best match in
O(E + V log(V )) where E is the number of edges and V
is the number of vertices.
Scaling computation with lazy recovery. Conventional
link-state protocols scale only to thousands of links, so how
can MINT, which is essentially a centralized link-state pro-
tocol, scale to millions of segments on the Internet? It can,
by using a different approach to update propagation and
fault detection. Conventional link-state-like protocols con-
trol plane recompute all destinations every time there is a
change in the network topology; the control plane in such
protocols must ensure consistency in hop-by-hop forward-
ing networks. In MINT we apply a lazy recovery approach
to convergence. Unlike in conventional protocols, MINT re-
lies on the head-end of each path to detect problems with a
path and request re-computation if necessary.
Lazy recovery provides several benefits. No state about
active paths needs to be stored in the transit-state database
(such state would be necessary to map the failure to the
paths that failed). This simplification also reduces both stor-
age and computing requirements; the mediator no longer
needs to recompute all the paths or map updates to determine
which paths might have failed. Lazy recovery also allows a
simplified client-mediator interface, which can be initiated
only by the client.
3.2 Data Plane
In this section, we describe MINT’s path setup, encapsu-
lation, and failure detection and recovery.
Path setup. Path setup could be performed in several ways:
(1) the mediator triggers setup in each participating ISP, (2)
the head-end (buyer) issues request to its neighbors or (3)
some hybrid of (1) and (2), where both the head-end and
mediator participate in path setup. Mediator-triggered path
setup could speed up path establishment and might simplify
accountability primitives, but it increases strain on a cen-
tralized system and limits decentralization capabilities. It
would also require a new path setup protocol. The head-end
based path-set up, on the other hand, is lightweight and, as
described further, does not need any new protocols. Hence,
MINT’s current design calls for the buyer to explicitly set up
paths.
Path requests sent to the mediator ( Figure 1) result
in path responses that contain a AS-level Explicit-Route-
Object (ERO) [18]. The ERO in the response contains
enough information for the source to initiate the reservation
procedure along the path. Although security and account-
ability is not our main focus, the XML schema can be easily
expanded to include security measures, such as the media-
tor’s signature for each path; such signatures could be used
to authenticate path establishment. Figure 4 shows an exam-
ple ERO.
When an exchange level ERO is received, domain to do-
main path setup is initiated. Within a domain, the ingress
router needs to compute node level path as shown in Fig-
ure 5. A Path Computation Element (PCE) [19] is used to
offload such requests. Note that PCEs can be co-locatedwith
the monitor described in Section 3.1.1 to aid in network re-
source management and monitoring.






<exchange2 id=0x333F via=10005 />
<exchange3 id=0x33FF via=10006 />
<excahnge4 id=0x3FFF via=10007 />
<destination id=0x3FFF AS=10003 />
</ero>
</response>






1. Exchange/AS Level ERO
2. Node Level ERO request
3. Node Level ERO
4. Stiching Label
5. Intra-domain Path Setup






Figure 5: Path setup process in a transit ISP. Inter-domain path stitch-
ing.
based forwarding for end-to-end paths. Flow forwarding
can be achieved with either hop-by-hop IP-in-IP tunneling
or label switching (e.g., MPLS [20]). Label switching allows
inter-domain paths to carry any payload. In the simplest case
such a payload would be plain IP packets between the source
and the destination domains. The source AS would establish
its own routing rules to route IP traffic though established
paths; unmodified packets would enter the destination AS
border router for further treatment. Aside from simple IP,
MINT also supports other types of encapsulation, such as
Ethernet frames, which would allow a source and destina-
tion to form a virtual interface, similar to what one would
form in a switched exchange. Such peers could even estab-
lish a BGP session over such virtual interfaces and exchange
traffic subject to BGP policies, allowing for a “virtual BGP
session”, even when two ASes are not physically present at
the same exchange.
As shown in Figure 5, the first (i.e. ingress) node in the
source network computes and establishes a label-switched
path to the last (i.e. egress) node. The egress node con-
tacts the ingress node in the next domain and requests a
stitching label for proper forwarding. This stitching label
allows the egress router to mark traffic traversing the ex-
change so that the next-hop ingress router can match it to
the appropriate path. The process is continued until the last
AS (noted in the destination parameter in the path request in
Figure 4) is reached and a path is established to its border
router. Such path stitching protocols for interdomain paths
are already supported by many vendors with most high-end
routing equipment; multiple standards already ensure com-
patibility across ASes and router vendors [21]. These pro-
tocols are primarily used today in networks that comprise
several autonomous systems; MINT enables the use of this
technology in the Internet at large by offering a transparent
MINT provides better network resource
utilization. Compared to a BGP-based
market, MINT increases the average re-
source utilization by a factor of 2.
Figure 13(a)
MINT increases the total welfare. MINT
increases the total welfare by 116% com-
pared to a system based on BGP.
Figure 15
Opening up the market increases de-
mand and supply matching. Using
MINT about 25% more requests are
matched than using BGP paths for match-
ing.
Figure 14(a).
Table 1: Summary of main results.
segment trading platform.
Fault detection in lazy recovery setup. MINT detects
faults in band, at the node where the path starts. Depend-
ing on the encapsulation mechanism, different fault detec-
tion mechanisms are possible. For example, if an Ethernet-
like virtual link is used, the remote nodes can use high-
performance fault detection mechanisms such as Bidirec-
tional Forwarding Detection (BFD) [22]. For important
paths, the edge may pre-compute backup paths; fail-over
time does not exceed hundreds of milliseconds in these cases
(which would be faster than a BGP fail-over by several or-
ders of magnitude). For less important paths, the edge sim-
ply sends a new computation request to the mediator to per-
form the whole path setup again.
Scalability. Both path computation and maintenance must
operate at Internet-scale. The main challenges are: (1) find-
ing node-level paths is a computationally intensive task and
it risks overloading the ingress routers, (2) the forwarding
tables in routers must be large enough to fit all the flows
traversing them, and (3) the routers with many traversing
paths must be able to sustain high path establishment and
tear down rates.
The Path Computation Element (PCE) [19] presents a pos-
sibility for setting up a node-level path. PCE is both a
name for the protocol framework and a name for the ele-
ment in that framework that computes constrained shortest
paths. In the simplest case, the computation in PCE is trig-
gered by the ingress router; more sophisticated scenarios al-
lows PCEs from different domains to interact to pick the best
egress-ingress router pairs at inter-domain boundary to bal-
ance load [23]. Dedicated path computation elements can
both reduce the computational load and balance load across
multiple ingress nodes.
Routing tables in today’s high-end routers can support
millions of label-switched paths at line-rate [24]. As far
as path setup is concerned reservations can be performed at
the rate of hundreds of thousands paths per second if neces-
sary [18]. If for some reason the routing infrastructure can-
not sustain the rate of path establishment and tear down, op-
erators can resort to using minimum-reservable-bandwidth
( 3.1.1) transit state announcements to reduce the maximum
number of paths that can be reserved on any given segment.
4. Economic Evaluation
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We evaluate MINT economic performance evaluation
metrics as well as scaling properties. This section deals with
the former while Section 5 deals with the latter. Economic
evaluation seeks to study resource utilization, utility to end
networks, and revenue/profits of ISPs. We compare these
metrics in networks served by MINT to the same networks
running conventional path-vector routing protocols.
While MINT can be used for a variety of traded com-
modities, we choose network bandwidth as the commodity
for evaluation in this section. A network bandwidth market
is well suited for our evaluation because the commodity is
a rivalrous good (i.e., a reservation prevents other reserva-
tions for the same bandwidth); it can be linearly priced (i.e.,
prices are set per megabit/second); and the bids for guaran-
teed bandwidth can be easily matched with available seg-
ments using simple shortest path algorithms. We summarize
the main results of this evaluation in Table 1.
4.1 Evaluation Metrics
We focus on three metrics for economic performance eval-
uation: (1) user utility (or surplus); (2) provider profit; and
(3) resource utilization.
User surplus. A successful bidder b’s utility is the differ-
ence between its valuation vb for a path, and the final price
pb it pays for the path; note that this price is the sum of
segment prices that comprise the path. If a bidder is unsuc-
cessful, i.e., if they are not allocated a path, we define their
utility as zero. We define user surplus as the sum of all user
utilities. In other words, if B∗ denotes the set of all success-
fully accepted bids, then user surplus is:
∑
b∈B∗ vb − pb.
Typically in our analysis, we will consider user surplus per
successful bid; in this case we normalize the user surplus by
the size of the set B∗.
ISP profit. In principle, an ISP’s profit is the difference
between its total revenue from participation in MINT, and
the costs incurred in running their network. Since costs are
exogenously determined constants, for the purposes of our
simulation, we set the cost to zero; thus we compute only
ISP revenue. Thus the total ISP profit is the sum of all pay-
ments to ISPs made when bids are accepted. (Note that ISPs
are paid exactly the segment price they posted.)
Network resource utilization. Finally, to gain insight into
the extent to whichMINT discovers and allocates unused ca-
pacity, we also study average resource utilization across the
network. In particular, for each segment j, let ℓj be the total
utilized capacity on that segment; and let cj be the capac-





j cj . Note that this is not a perfect metric; for
example, a more efficient routing of the same traffic matrix
could cause this metric to decrease. However, as the results
demonstrate, this metric provides good insight into the rel-
ative benefits of MINT compared to traditional BGP-based
protocols.
4.2 Simulation Setup
We developed a custom, event-driven simulator to eval-
uate different market mechanisms. A high-level simulator



















Figure 6: High-level evaluation model. The market matches the de-
mand given the current topology. Demand is exogenous to the model,
while the topology (including segment prices and segment capacities)
changes as the simulation is running.
































Figure 7: Average utilization convergence over the duration of simula-
tion.
ket simulator are the topology and the demand. The topol-
ogy is a graph of exchanges connected with segments as
links. Each segment has a capacity and a price associated
with it; both these parameters change as the simulation pro-
gresses. The demand is determined by a bid arrival process,
where each bid has an associated maximum valuation, ca-
pacity constraint, and desired duration; we assume the de-
mand process statistics are stationary for the lifetime of the
simulation. As bids arrive, the market attempts to immedi-
ately match the bid to a path given the current topology; if
this is not possible, the bid is blocked. As capacities change,
the pricing of the segments is updated; see Section 4.3 for
further details on our price update model.
Each simulation run represents 200 iterations of market
operation; ISPs issue price updates at the end of every iter-
ation cycle. The chosen length of simulation was generally
sufficient to observe market convergece to equilibrium. As
seen in Figure 7, in most cases segment utilization and sub-







Table 2: Network topologies used for market evaluation. PeeringDB
topology is derived directly from the peering database. Orbis-24 and
Orbis-48 are extrapolated from the PeeringDB topology to have 24 and
48 exchanges accordingly.






























Figure 8: Simulation convergence to average segment price. MINT
market model, 1000 requests per second.
To create a realistic exchange-level topology we used the
PeeringDB [25] database. It contains public and private ex-
change points, along with a list of domains that participate in
such exchanges. The seed topology contains 201 exchanges
and 1116 domains. Many domains participate in more than
one exchange; we noted 3804 unique domain presences in
all exchanges. We assumed that when a domain participates
in more than one exchange, it can provide segments between
such exchanges. This approach yielded 15439 possible seg-
ments.
We also generated two smaller test topologies for faster
experimentation. We used the Orbis [26] topology genera-
tion tool for new topology generator. Orbis takes a graph as
an input, and produces a graph with given size and similar
properties. We used our PeeringDB topology as a seed, and
used Orbis to generate one topology with 24 exchanges and
another with 48 exchanges. Table 2 shows the properties of
the topologies we used in our evaluation.
We used the Orbis-24 topology as the reference testing
topology. The Orbis-48 topology was used to rerun some
experiments to confirm if similar trends hold as the graph
size changes. Figure 8 shows that the larger topology takes
slightly more time to converge. The larger network also re-
sults in a lower average price, due to a higher number of
underutilized segments.
Segment capacities. We derive segment capacities in the
PeeringDB topology from the declared speeds at the ex-
changes. Each participant in the database documents the
speed of its connection to the exchange. When we form a
segment (link) between two exchanges, we take the mini-






































Figure 9: We use two aggregate demand curves to simulate path val-
uation: one with high variance in valuations, and another with low
variance in valuations. X-axis is price, y-axis is the number of users in
the population willing to pay that price.
mum of the two declared speeds. While this can overes-
timate real capacities and does not account for competing
requests that might be using an overlapping set of links at
the network core, it provides a good starting point for mar-
ket evaluation. The simulated Orbis topologies derive their
capacities from the capacity distribution in the PeeringDB
topology. The capacities of each segment change during the
simulation as paths are reserved and released.
4.2.2 Demand
The demand from end users is defined by four distinct pa-
rameters: (1) bid arrival rate (in number of bids per itera-
tion), (2) desired reservation time for each bid (in number of
iterations) (3) requested capacity, and (4) bid valuation.
Requested capacity. From the topology and the capaci-
ties described in Section 4.2.1 we generate a traffic matrix
that nominally maximizes network resource utilization. This
trafficmatrix gives the mean requested capacity per iteration.
Formally, let fsd denote the mean requested data rate be-
tween source s and destination d. We define a weight αsd
as the logarithm of the shortest path length from s to d.
Our nominal traffic matrix thenmaximizes the weighted sum∑
s,d α
sdfsd, subject to the exogenously specified capacity
constraints in the network.
This nominal traffic matrix achieves two goals. First, it
ensures that our arriving demands are well matched to net-
work capacity, and will saturate some subset of segments in
the network. Second, it ensures that we have a good mix of
traffic between long and short path length flows in the net-
work.
Request rates and reservation time. To achieve liquid-
ity, we dynamically issue multiple requests between each
source and destination that has a non-zero mean requested
capacity fsd. Requests arrive as a Poisson process at a
rate of λ requests per interval; given the mean flow fsd be-
tween source s and destination d, the size of each request
follows a Pareto distribution with tail exponent 2, and mean
µsd = fsd/λ. We vary the parameter λ in our simulations
to study the effects of increasing liquidity.
The reservation time determines how long the successful
request keeps the bandwidth. We draw reservation time from
a Pareto distribution with mean equal to 3 iterations, and tail
exponent 2.
Request valuation. Each request has an associated val-
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Purchase Any path Valley-free paths
Pricing Segment pricing Segment pricing
Table 3: Two market models and their differences. We assume segment
pricing for BGP.
uation per unit of bandwidth. For evaluation purposes, we
use two different demand curves, shown in Figure 9. The x-
axis shows the price P per bandwidth unit, while the y-axis
shows the number of users Q in our simulated population
prepared to pay that price. We draw prices from a Gaussian
distribution using a mean of 50 price units and a standard
deviation of 12.5 (resp., 25) for low variance (resp., high
variance) demand. Note that the y-axis in our case repre-
sents a proportion of the population willing to pay at least
any given price. For example, in low variance demand, a
price of 40 units will be affordable for 75% of users, while
in the high variance demand model only 65% of users are
prepared to pay the same price for a unit of bandwidth. Both
demand curves are normalized: two equally large popula-
tions drawn from these two curves will produce the same
aggregate valuation—only the variance will differ.
4.3 Market Formation
We compare two market models in our paper: the market
formed by the MINT protocol, and the market formed by
path-vector routing using BGP. These two models differ in
resource discovery and in demand-to-supply matching.
The difference between the markets is outlined in Table 3.
When a new bid for bandwidth arrives at the network, it must
be matched to the existing topology accordingly to the mar-
ket model in use. The following subsections describe how
discovery and purchase choices are made in each model.
MINT discovery and request matching. Supply and de-
mand matching in MINT is done sequentially using the con-
strained shortest path algorithm. The mediator has complete
information about the advertised segments. First, the algo-
rithm prunes edges that do not match the capacity require-
ments and then runs Dijkstra’s algorithm on the resulting
graph using price as the distance metric. The resulting path
is the lowest price path that contains enough bandwidth for
the request (if such a path exists).
The matching, in essence, performs a reverse combinato-
rial auction. There are several ways to price the end path.
In our model, we set the end-to-end path price as the sum
of segment prices. This is a version of a first-price auction,
though it is carried out dynamically and continuously. It is
also possible to implement alternative designs; for example,
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [8] auction is a more so-
phisticated auction design where the winning seller gets a
payment indicated by the second best offer. In the case of
MINT, such an arrangement could be implemented by defin-
ing the effective price of each segment j in a path (found by
the constrained shortest path algorithm) as the difference be-
tween the best end-to-end price in a graph with segment j,






























Figure 10: Average segment price for different loads as time progresses.
Higher load produces higher prices.
and the best end-to-end price in a graph without segment j.
BGP discovery and request matching. BGP is a path-
vector protocol. Each participant in the protocol selects
one best path and forwards announcements about such paths
downstream. Thus, the number of paths any source can
choose is limited to the number of neighbors it has. Fur-
ther more, paths propagate subject to policy constraints. The
policy constraints enforce valley-free property [27].
We implement a version of BGP routing that can be di-
rectly compared to MINT.When requests arrive from source
s, we construct a spanning BGP tree for each neighbor
n ∈ Ns (where Ns is a set of s neighbors) starting with
n as root and ending at all other nodes. We prefer shorter
paths over longer paths, breaking ties to prefer paths with
lower total price. While constructing such trees we avoid
the non-valley-free paths. To find valley-free paths we infer
the relationships between participating autonomous systems
using a simple heuristic. For two ASes i and j, we say that
i is a service provider for j if Ni > Nj , and vice versa; in
case Ni = Nj we break the tie randomly. Such a heuristic
allows us to build a hypothetical hierarchical structure that
can be explored to build valley-free paths.
For each constructed BGP tree starting at each neighbor
of source s, we find the path to destination d. We eliminate
paths that cannot provide enough bandwidth and pick the
lowest priced path among the remaining paths.
Note that our algorithm matches BGP in its path discov-
ery; however, in contrast to the use of BGP in the current
Internet, our BGP-based model prices path segments. In
the current Internet, the interconnections are priced on long
timescales, instead of fast timescale pricing of segments.
Similarly, end users on the Internet pay directly only for
their immediate upstream connection, while in our BGP-
based model buyers pay each ISP on the allocated path for
use of their segment. Although unusual, this model allows
us to directly evaluate the effectiveness of MINT in exploit-
ing available capacity that lies dormant under standard BGP
9
































Figure 11: Average utilization convergence over time. Despite different
demand profiles, the utilization is moderated around the same level.
path discovery mechanisms; our use of prices in both models
controls for the effects of introducing a market model.
Segment pricing. We apply a simple segment pricing
heuristic that seeks to maximize the resource utilization of
each ISP without selling segments or connections at a loss.
Resource utilization maximization is justifiable because the
marginal cost of allocating available capacity (until a desired
utilization threshold is reached) is nearly zero.
Each ISP updates prices for their segments independently,
as follows. Initially, the price of each segment is set to a
small value. The price is then updated according to the load.
If load is below a fraction τ of the link capacity, we reduce
the price by a multiplicative factor β; on the other hand, if
load is above a fraction τ of the link capacity, we increase the
price by a multiplicative factor β. We use a factor τ = 0.8
in our simulations. In our experiments, we found that β = 2
provided a reasonable convergence time. For example, Fig-
ure 10 shows prices converging within 50 iterations.
4.4 Results
Figures 7, 10, 11 and 12 show the convergence properties
of the market models. There are two dimensions to conver-
gence: convergence of resource utilization, and convergence
of prices. The average utilization as reported in the figures,
corresponds to the reservation load on all the segments of the
network, averaged by the number of such segments. Simi-
larly, the average price is the sum of all segment prices nor-
malized by number of segments.
We study the impact of convergence as we vary request
granularity and the valuation profile. Request granularity is
altered by changing the arrival rate λ; note that in our model,
this still leaves the mean source-destination flow unchanged
(cf. Section 4.2.2). The high and low variance demand pro-
files are described in Section 4.2.2; note that total user val-
uation grows with number of requests.
Figures 7 and 11 show that utilization peaks initially and
then, after approximately 30 iterations is moderated by the





























Figure 12: Average price convergence over time given different de-
mand. Due to limited path discovery, demand variance doesn’t sig-
nificantly affect the BGP market.
price. The effect is less pronounced in case of BGP, because
most of the of the network is underutilized. We can correlate
that with the price plots (Figures 10 and 12), where we see
that prices reach their equilibrium around at around 30-50
iterations. In case of the BGP market, the demand variance
does not considerably affect the market due to a limited abil-
ity to explore more paths. The few paths that are available
get utilized from the very start independent of the demand
variance.
Figure 13 shows the price and utilization trends as we in-
crease the number of requests in the system. As expected, in
case of MINT, the utilization reaches a steady level when the
number of requests is enough to saturate the capacity com-
puted by our maximum-flow formulation. At 100, 200 and
400 requests per iteration, the network is not fully utilized
under MINT, as the granularity of the requests often results
in denied capacity. As we increase the requests, more users
contend for the same bandwidth and at the rate of 600 re-
quests per iteration it achieves constant average utilization.
The BGP-based market takes more requests to find a stable
resource utilization. Most importantly, we find that MINT
improves resource utilization over BGP by approximately
100%.
Figure 13(b) shows the average price trends as we increase
number of requests for different simulations. As MINT
loads more segments, the average price over the network is
much higher. The unutilized segments in the BGP market
drive the average segment price down.
Figure 14 summarizes the main results of our simulation.
First we can see in Figure 14(a) that MINT attains a higher
successful bid rate in comparison to the BGP-based market
(MINT has approximately 25% more successful bids). As
we compare the user surpluse per successful bid in the BGP-
based market and MINT, we observe that the difference is
negligible—in fact BGP has slight a edge. Marginally higher
surplus in BGP can be explained by the fact that only the bids
with the highest valuations managed to secure reservations.
10
































































(b) Average per-bid surplus.































(c) Average per-bid profit.
Figure 14: Bid success rate and the surplus/profit per-successful-bid as we vary the request rate.
The most interesting trend is in Figure 14(c), where it is seen
that ISP profits in MINT are much higher.
Finally, Figure 15 shows the total welfare (user surplus
plus ISP profit) the markets produce. Not surprisingly,
MINT produces approximately 116% greater welfare in
comparison to the BGP-based market. This result is a com-
bination of higher resource utilization, and a greater percent-
age of successful bids.
5. Scalability
To be feasible, MINT has to scale to the size of the current
and future Internet. In this section, we evaluate the scaling
performance of MINT. We examine how much memory the
mediator needs to store the state of advertised path segments,
both for the current AS-level topology and in the future. We
also examine mediator computational power requirements.
5.1 Memory Requirements
The number of ASes in the Internet is growing all the
time–the number of paths MINT needs to serve will grow
as well. We show the amount of storage today is manage-
able and that the growth rate is manageable given projected
growth in semiconductor technology. There are two primary
components in MINT that where we study memory require-
ments: at the mediator, and at routers on a forwarding path.
Memory overhead at the mediator. The mediator must
store the state of each segment. We pick an approximate
storage size for each update with the following parameter
assumptions: 32 bytes for segment end-point identification;
16 bytes for available bandwidth; and 24 bytes for price
information—a total of 72 bytes. Table 4 shows the pro-
jected size of the Internet in 2020 [28] and the correspond-
ing size and cost of the mediator memory to maintain state.
To compute the expected number of segments, we use the
extrapolated number of ASes and generate a graph using Or-
bis [26], which allows arbitrary scaling of Internet topolo-
gies. Table 4 shows that MINT is technically feasible; we
see that the growth in the number of segments (and hence the
memory the mediator requires) is outpaced by the expected
drop in DRAM prices. Thus, even as storage required for
MINT segments increases, the overall cost of memory re-
quired to support the necessary storage will fall.
Component 2007 2020
DRAM $/Gbit 9.6 0.3
CPU Frequency (GHz) 4.7 12.4
Internet(AS) 25,000 60,000
Segments 68M 400M
Memory (Cost) 4.6GB ($353) 27GB ($64)
Table 4: Growth projections for the Internet, the memory cost and the
CPU speeds [29].
Memory requirements on routers A forwarding node has
to be able to maintain information about all the paths that
pass through it. Because MINT may be used in conjunction
with BGP—as opposed to being an outright replacement—
we don’t expect bids for connecting every AS to every AS.
Instead, we envision MINT being used to satisfy bids for
paths with very specific purposes, such as establishing re-
liable paths to subsets of content providers. As a simple
scenario, we consider a case where edge networks wish to
establish reliable, high quality paths to a subset of destina-
tions. We evaluate such a scenario on an AS-level graph
from RouteViews [30] where 80% of total ASes would be
willing to pay for a path to destinations, which currently
form about 5% of the Internet [28]. The busiest AS in such
case has a few million (5.5) paths passing through it. Since
ASes have multiple border routers, each router will have to
store a few hundred thousand paths in memory; this is feasi-
ble with current technology. Further, techniques such as [24]
can be applied to reduce the router memory requirements to
even lower levels.
5.2 Computational Requirements
In this section, we exploreMINT’s computational require-
ments, and how these requirements are likely to scale with
both the growth of the Internet and various failure rates. We
first examine how the growth of the Internet might affect
the increase in the number of bids that the MINT media-
tor would have to satisfy. We then examine how increasing
failure rates might affect the scaling of the mediator—both
in terms of the number of updates that the mediator would
need to process and in terms of the frequency with which the
mediator would have to recompute new end-to-end paths as
11
































































Figure 13: Utilization and price trends as we vary the request rate.
a result of changes in available segments and capacities.
Bid-induced computations To estimate the bid-arrival rate
that the mediator would need to process we consider the
same scenario as in the previous section, where 80% of ASes
(stubs) request paths to 5% of destination ASes. We also
assume that ASes periodically re-evaluate their path require-
ments and re-submit bids accordingly. Increasing either frac-
tion (of destinations and stubs) would affect the bid rate lin-
early. Table 5 shows the estimated number of queries that the
mediator has to process in such a scenario. We also show the
case where the fraction of CPs is 10%, translating to a higher
query rate (twice the rate) at the mediator. We see that the
number of queries that the mediator has to process due to the
larger number of ASes increases only by a factor of 5.5 by
2020. Improvements in chip density as well as chip frequen-
cies in the same timeframe (Table 4) are expected to outpace
this rate quite comfortably.






















Figure 15: Total system surplus as we vary the request rate.







Table 5: Bids (queries/sec.) the MINT mediator must process.
Failure-induced churn In this section, we study the effects
of link failure rates inside an AS on MINT. Link failures
affect ASes in which they occur, by reducing the segment
capacities that the AS might have advertised to the mediator,
and hence also the mediator as it has to recompute paths and
also re-assign affected paths.
We first explore how failure rates of links within each AS
affect the rate of updates seen at the mediator. Let ”segment
failure” denote the case when a segment is either discon-
nected or has its capacity reduced as as result of link failure.
The number of announcements is proportional to the num-
ber of segment failures. We would expect to see announce-
ments scale linearly with failure rates. (note that in BGP, a
single link failure can produce a non-linear amount of up-
dates [31]). To avoid frequent churn-induced updates, ASes
could have an incentive to under-advertise their links. We
also study the effect under-advertisement has on the number
of announcements.
We use the Rocketfuel Point-of-Presence (PoP) topologies
for AS 1239 (Sprint) and AS 3356 (Level 3), assuming that
the inferred links weights reflect actual link capacities [32].
For each topology, we initially allocate capacity for all seg-
ments to be the bandwidth of the largest bottleneck link in
the segment. The capacity that an AS advertises to the me-
diator is assumed to be some fraction of this initial capacity,
which we define as the advertisement ratio. We fail intra-AS
links at random, recalculate segment capacities, and deter-
mine the resultant number of updates received at the media-
12



































Figure 16: Number of updates resulting from churn inside AS 1239.
tor.
Figure 16 shows the number of announcements, for dif-
ferent failure rates, averaged over fifty trials. For AS 1239,
advertising 50% of segment capacities reduce the number
of announcements to the mediator by 32%, while adver-
tising 20% of capacities reduces the number of announce-
ments by 41%. Similarly, for AS 3356 (not shown due to
space constraints), an 50% capacity advertisement reduces
the number of announcements by 53% while 20% capac-
ity adverisements reduces the number by 57%. The results
confirm our expectation that update announcements increase
linearly with failure rates. The mediator has to process these
updates in order to recompute and reallocate paths, hence
the computational requirements at the mediator also scale
linearly.
6. Related Work
Bandwidth was recognized early as a potential market
commodity. In 1999, Enron Communications proposed a
bandwidth market for buying and selling bandwidth as an
exchangeable commodity on the basis of a standard contract
between the parties involved. The Bandwidth Trading Or-
ganization (BTO) [33] is similar to the mediator in that it
serves as the central clearing house. They key difference is
that the BTO is governed by physical traders of bandwidth
while the mediator is an automated marketplace. Moreover,
as in MINT, Pooling Point Administration, which is done
by transit networks in MINT, is independent from the BTO.
Exchanges like Arbinet [34] and Equinix [35] offer products
and services that allow better network connectivity and route
management. Unlike MINT, their market is not open and the
services may be limited to the few QoS classes supported
by the exchanges. Electronic bulletin boards like BuySell-
Bandwidth [36] allow bandwidth buyers and sellers to post
goods needed or sold but does not mediate the exchange of
goods by enforcing any particular contract between parties
involved. In contrast, MINT offers a market mechanism to
profitably exchange goods.
The bandwidth exchange market, BAND-X [37] offers a
clearing house for spot and future market operation. It also
incorporates accounting and authorization mechanisms. Un-
like MINT, the clearing house may simply be an electronic
bulletin board like [36] and the customer may need to con-
struct end-to-end path herself. M3I technology [38] offers
multiple services using end-to-end session-oriented business
models over a connectionless service. Bill-Pay [39] uses a
micro-payment scheme to extend the bilateral contracts be-
tween service providers and encourage them to provide bet-
ter services. In contrast, MINT works at a higher granularity
and allows implementation of diverse business models while
offering an open market for connectivity to foster competi-
tion and efficient resource utilization. The recent spate of
de-peering [2–4], the availability of excess capacity [40] and
evidence for increasing market competitiveness [41] seem to
support the rationale for MINT in todays Internet.
Open market models have been recognized as possibly
effective resource allocation schemes for large distributed
systems [42]. While MINT does not propose entirely new
market mechanisms, it may benefit from developments in
multipart combinatorial auctions [43]. Moreover, we do not
analyze price dynamics due geographical arbitrage and liq-
uidity effects and market dynamics due to network failures.
The work by Cheliotis et al. [44] provides direction for such
analysis. Our work is also related to congestion pricing [45],
which is a form of market segmentation according to user
resource requirements and willingness-to-pay.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has presented MINT, a market structure and
supporting set of protocols for enabling edge networks to
purchase end-to-end paths from ISPs that sell path segments
between exchange points. We have introduced a new mar-
ket structure—and a set of supporting routing protocols—
for buying and selling Internet paths that can co-exist with
the existing interdomain routing framework and can operate
using protocols that are already deployed on today’s Internet
routers. Given the recent network neutrality debates regard-
ing the cost of access, MINT may also provide an alternative
for transit and access ISPs to sell end-to-end paths to edge
networks that might not otherwise be profitable. We briefly
conclude with several interesting related issues and open di-
rections.
Multiple mediators. We briefly describe how MINT
could be adapted to a setting with multiple mediators. In
a distributed case, key ISPs (or any network participant
with enough resources) can maintain copies of the transit-
state database. At each independent participant, dedicated
middle-boxes can form SOAP sessions with their neigh-
bors to form a transit-state exchange network that keeps
the database up-to-date. The neighbors in such a network
would exchange updates periodically with update intervals
long enough to process all the updates received during the
exchange window. In facilitating non-hierarchical update
distribution the network could run an OSPF-like flooding
mechanism; unlike OSPF, however, the transit-states would
not trigger the path computations (as described above) and
would be first processed and delayed before forwarding. (In
high performance OSPF-like protocols the priority is to for-
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ward the updates.) Even with long update intervals (e.g.,
on the order of several hours), if network participants estab-
lish a well connected update exchange graph, the updates
could propagate through the network within a dozen or less
exchange sessions. Stale information and blocked path re-
quests are the main side effect of such decentralization; fail-
ure detection speed and recovery is not affected.
Contract enforcement. This paper has focused on a market
for establishing contracts, but has not developed any mech-
anisms for actually enforcing those contracts. We believe,
however, that MINT-style contracts may be more enforce-
able than the bilateral contracts that exist in today’s Internet,
primarily because either the mediator or the party that pur-
chases the path has direct recourse when an end-to-end path
is not performing as expected. Additionally, all traffic passes
through exchanges, which could serve as natural places for
monitoring traffic. In future work, we plan to examine how
contracts in MINT could be enforced.
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